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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of the Utah Labor Commission 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-303(6), and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Whether the Judge Sessions and the Appeals Board erred in addressing 
Temporary Total Disability claims for the period from March 18, 1999 to October 22,2002 
in its September 23, 2005 . (Rec. 151-153, 460-463). 
2. Whether Judge Sessions and the Appeals Board erred in determining that Ms. 
Clausing, hereafter referred to as "Clausing," was entitled to Total Temporary Disability 
compensation of $487.00 per week for each week from March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004. 
(Rec. 151-153,460-463). 
3. Whether the Appeals Board erred in determining that a Motion for Review 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(l) is the sole avenue for challenging the language of a 
Labor Commission Order. (Rec. 461-462). 
4. Whether the Appeals Board erred in determining that confusion arising from 
ambiguities in the language of a Labor Commission order must be challenged within 30 days 
of the entry of the order even though the existence of the confusion does not become known 
until the 30 days have passed. (Rec. 461-462). 
5. Whether the Appeals Board erred in upholding Judge Session's determination 
that Frito-Lay and/or Transcontinental Insurance Company, hereafter referred to as 
"Appellant" failed to provide sufficient grounds for the relief requested in the Motion for 
Reconsideration. (Rec. 461-463). 
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6. Whether Judge Sessions erred/abused discretion in determining that Appellant 
failed to provide sufficient grounds for the relief requested in the Motion for 
Reconsideration. (Rec. 407-409, 461-463). 
Standards of Review 
Legal Questions: 
"We review the Commission's interpretations of law under a correction-of-error 
standard." Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n. 685 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah 1984). The 
"determination of whether res judicata bars an action presents a question of law," which is 
reviewed for correctness. Macris & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000). 
Fact Questions: 
"We review the Commission's factual findings under a deferential standard." Tax 
Comm'n v. Induslrial Comm'n. 685 P.2d 10515 1052 (Utah 1984). The Appeals Court will 
review the Labor Commission's "factual determinations to see whether they are 'supported 
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record.' . . . Substantial evidence 
has been described as 'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" Acosta v. Labor Commission, 44 P.3d 
819, 826 (Utah App. 2002). Further, 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the 
findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached. . . . The failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact on 
material issues renders its findings arbitrary and capricious unless the evidence 
is clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion. 
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990). 
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Mixed Questions: 
"A mixed question of law and fact [is] reviewed for reasonableness and rationality." 
Acosta v. Labor Commission, 44 P.3d 819, 822 (Utah App. 2002). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
UCA34A-2-801(2): 
Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an 
administrative law judge in accordance with Subsection (3), the 
decision of an administrative law judge on an application for 
hearing filed under Subsection (1) is a dinal order of the 
commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued. 
UCA34A-2-410(l)(a) 
UCA63-46b-13 
UCA 34A-2-420(l) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellants appeal the September 23,2005 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order issued by Judge Dale W. Sessions of the Labor Commission, as well as the Order 
Dismissing Respondent' s Rule 60(b) Motion entered by the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission on October 23, 2006. 
February 12, 2001 to October 22, 2002 Litigation 
On February 12, 2001, Clausing filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor 
Commission requesting Temporary Total Disability as well as medical expenses from a 
March 18, 1999 incident. (Rec. 360). It was soon thereafter amended to seek Permanent 
Partial Disability and recommended medical care. (Rec. 362,364). The injuries complained 
of were to the: 1) knee; 2) elbow; and 3) lumbar spine. (Rec. 364). The parties settled these 
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matters at ahearing on Januaryl4,2002. (Rec. 364-368,371). No settlement documents were 
em* executed and signed, however, at the request of Clausing's attorney, the Administrative 
Law Judge, Judge Sharon J. Eblen, issued a October 22,2002 Order based on the January 14, 
2002 in-court settlement stipulations of the parties. (Rec. 364-365). The settlement, and 
October 22, 2002 Order, approved Permanent Partial Impairment of 8.5% and awarded all 
medical expenses for the 1) knee, 2) elbow, and 3) lumbar spine. (Rec. 364-368). No 
Temporary Total Disability was awarded, inasmuch as Clausing was working at the time, and 
all time where she had not worked up to that date, October 22, 2002, had already been paid. 
(Rec. 364-368). 
July 17, 2003 to September 23, 2005 Litigation 
On or about July 17, 2003, Clausing filed a second Application for Hearing, again 
claiming injuries to the 1) knee, 2) elbow, and 3) lumbar spine from the March 18, 1999 
incident. (Rec. 1). She also included new claims relating to her neck and a stroke. (Rec. 1). 
Clausing sought Permanent Partial Disability, medical expenses, Temporary Partial 
Disability, recommended medical care, travel expenses, interest and Temporary Total 
Disability for "only misc. dates missed after surgeries or for treatment prior to MMI." (Rec. 
376-377). Clausing had been employed at various times since March 1999 and MMI 
occurred, as admitted by Clausing, prior to April 2004. (Rec. 377). On stipulation of the 
parties, the claims were submitted to a medical panel. (Rec. 105-112, 152). The medical 
panel determined that the new neck and stroke claims were not related to the March 1999 
injury. (Reel 16, 118, 153). 
The Administrative Law Judge, Judge Dale Sessions, then issued his September 23, 
2005 Order incorporating a work history between March 18, 1999 and June 10,2004 as set 
forth in an attached Stipulation, stating that $487.00/wk Temporary Total Disability would 
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be owed for the period between March 18, 1999 and June 10, 2004, and that the Appellant 
would be entitled to offset any such award for any amounts previously paid. (Rec). 
Considering the facts that Clausing had: 1) only requested Total Temporary Disability 
compensation for undefined "misc. dates" prior to reaching MMI; 2) admittedly reached 
MMI on the compensable injury at some time prior to April 2004; 3) admitted in the 
Stipulation that she had worked for the overwhelming majority of time since her March 18, 
1999 injury; and 4) already settled and judicially resolved all her claims as of October 22, 
2002, the Appellant reasonably interpreted the September 23, 2005 Order as limiting any 
Temporary Total Disability compensation to the eligible unworked and unpaid dates from 
October 22,2002 to no later than June 10,2004. Any other interpretation would not only be 
contrary to the factual evidence presented to the Labor Commission, but to the September 
23, 2005 Order itself. 
On December 1, 2005, Clausing unexpectedly demanded $123,061.20 in Temporary 
Total Disability, for the period between March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004. (Rec. 394). The 
affidavit of Clausing's counsel openly admits that this amount is not based on any factual 
evidence, but rather, entirely based on Clausing's intentional misinterpretation of the 
September 23, 2006 Order. (Rec. 393-394). Clausing openly argues that even though the 
factual evidence does not support the claim for Temporary Total Disability compensation, 
she is nonetheless entitled to $123,061.20 because the loose language of the September 23, 
2005 Order arguably allows such an interpretation. (Rec. 393-396). As of December 20, 
2005, Clausing increased her demand to $183,561.85. (Rec. 157). 
This recovery, if allowed, not only constitutes a double recovery, but it is barred by, 
among other things: 1) res judicata based on the October 22,2002 Order; 2) the January 14, 
2002 settlement; 3) the Stipulation, incorporated into the September 23, 2005 Order, 
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admitting that Clausing worked for the majority of time from March 18, 1999 to June 10, 
2005; 4) the admission that Clausing reached MMI sometime prior to April 2004; and 5) 
Clausing's admission that she has intentionally misinterpreted the September 23,2005 Order. 
Course of Proceedings 
On December 21, 2005, upon learning of the position taken by Clausing relating to 
the September 23, 2005 Order, Appellant filed a motion asking for relief from Judge 
Session's Order. The motion was denied on March 17,2006 purportedly because it contained 
"insufficient grounds," was not a proper motion, and was not timely filed. On April 17, 
2006, the Appellant filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the Labor 
Commission. On October 23, 2006, the Appeals Board stated that it was "aware that Judge 
Session's [September 2005 Order] may have awarded excessive temporary total disability 
compensation to Ms. Clausing," but nevertheless refused to remedy the improper order 
because the Appellant was not entitled to file a "Rule 60(b)" motion, or its equivalent, with 
the Labor Commission. 
The Appellant hereby appeals the October 23, 2006 Appeals Board Order and the 
September, 23, 2005 Order issued by Judge Sessions. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On February 9, 2001, Petitioner filed her first Application for Hearing, requesting 
medical expenses and temporary total compensation from a March 18,1999 incident. 
(Rec. 360). The Application was amended on October 11,2001, to include a claim for 
recommended medical treatment and permanent partial impairment. (Rec. 362,364). 
2. At hearing, on January 14, 2002, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which 
was reduced to an Order by Judge Sharon Eblen on October 22, 2002 thereby 
resolving all matters. (Rec. 364-368, 371). 
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3. Ten months later, on July 17, 2003, Petitioner filed another Application for Hearing 
again based on the March 18, 1999 incident. In addition to the previous injuries, 
Clausing claimed a neck injury and a stroke. Clausing sought Permanent Partial 
Disability, medical expenses, Temporary Partial Disability, recommended medical 
care, travel expenses, interest and Temporary Total Disability. (Rec. 1). 
4. Clausing's July 2003 Application material did not identify any time allegedly missed 
from work as a result of the injuries. (Rec. 1). 
5. On April 12,2004, Clausing filed her Prehearing Disclosures, limiting the Temporary 
Total Disability compensation claims to "only misc. dates missed after surgeries or 
for treatment prior to MMI." Clausing's Prehearing Disclosures also admit that she 
reached MMI for all injuries, other than the neck injury, prior to April 12,2004.(Rec. 
376-377). 
6. The Parties entered a Stipulation containing the following work history from March 
18, 1999 to September 14, 2004: 
5/17/99, working with Appellant 
12/29/99, working with Orbit (20 hrs/week) 
1/10/00, not working (surgery) 
2/28/00, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
4/30/00, working with Orbit (20 hrs/week) 
5/20/00, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
5/30/00, not working (surgery) 
6/21/00, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
6/28/00, not working (surgery) 
8/16/00, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
9/11/00, not working (surgery) 
10/2/00, working with Orbit (20 hrs/week) 
4/4/02, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
4/18/02, not working (surgery) 
5/30/02, working with Orbit (20 hrs/week) 
10/19/02, working with Orbit (40 hrs/week) 
5/5/03, working with ISG (40 hrs/week) 
3/18/99 
5/8/99 
12/30/99 
1/11/00 
2/29/00 
5/1/00 
5/21/00 
5/31/00 
6/22/00 
6/29/00 
8/17/00 
9/12/00 
10/3/00 
4/5/02 
4/19/02 
5/31/02 
10/20/02 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
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5/5/03 to 3/1/04, not working (laid off) 
3/1/04 to 6/25/04, working with Pacific Rim (40 hrs/week) 
5/25/04 (Laid off) 
6/25/04 to 9/14/04, not working 
(Rec. 109). 
7. The Parties submitted the case to a Medical Panel based on the Stipulation which 
identified the issues in dispute as "the claimed stroke from the August 17,2000 right 
knee surgery, medical causation of the neck injury, reasonableness of the proposed 
neck surgery, and whether additional medical care for the right knee is necessary and 
related to the industrial injury." Temporary Total Disability was not included in the 
Stipulation, and therefore, not an issue for the Medical Panel. (Rec. 105-111). 
8. The Medical Panel determined that the neck injury was not related to the March 18, 
1999 incident, and that there was no evidence of any stroke. (Reel 16, 118, 153). 
9. On September 23, 2005, Judge Sessions entered an Order stating: 
9. Petitioner is awarded temporary total disability compensation from 
March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004. The applicable computation rare is 
$487.00 per week. 
14. [Appellant] is permitted an offset for amounts previously paid by 
[Appellant] in all areas of this award. 
16. Finally, Petitioner's claims related to stroke and cervical injury are 
expressly denied. 
(Rec. 151-154). 
10. The Court, in its September 2003 Order, recognized and incorporated the Stipulation 
setting forth Clausing's work dates. (Rec. 152). 
11. Recognizing the fact that Clausing had: 1) requested Temporary Total Disability only 
for "misc. dates" since the injury; 2) stipulated to the work history contained in the 
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Stipulation showing that Clausing worked for the majority of time between March 
1999 to June 10,2004; 3) admittedly reached MMI at some time prior to April 2004; 
and 4) formally settled all claims previous to October 22, 2002, the Appellant 
reasonably believed that the Order's Temporary Total Disability language was limited 
to only unpaid and eligible "misc. dates" between March 18,1999 and June 10,2004. 
(Rec. 346, 404-405). 
12. On December 1, 2005, Clausing, for the first time asserted that she was entitled to 
$123,061.20 for Temporary Total Disability from March 18, 1999 to June 10,2004. 
This amount was based on the $487.00 weekly compensation rate multiplied by 
190.88 weeks during the stated period, plus interest. (Rec. 394). On December 20, 
2005 Clausing increased her demand to $183,561.85. (Rec. 157) 
13. Clausing's attorney, Dawn Atkin, admitted that the December 2005 demands were 
entirely based on Clausing's own self-serving interpretation of the September 23, 
2005 Order, was admittedly not based on the evidence, and was contrary to the work 
history and the parties' February 2005 Stipulation. She further admitted that the 
demand was sought simply because the loose language of the September 23, 2005 
Order allowed it, and because no "post-order motion or timely appeal" was filed by 
the Appellant. (Rec. 393-394). 
14. On December 6,2005, Appellant's Counsel sent a letter to Dawn Atkin disputing the 
$123,061.20 claimed. (Rec. 404-405). 
15. On December 21, 2005, within 20 days of learning of claim for $123,061.20, 
Appellant filed a motion requesting relief from the Clausing's intentional 
misinterpretation of the September 23, 2005 Order. (Rec. 163). 
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16. On March 17, 2006, the motion for relief was denied with Judge Sessions asserting 
that he had no authority to correct the misinterpretation or mistake. (Rec. 299). 
17. On April 17, 2006, the Appellant filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board 
of the Labor Commission. (Rec.338-339). 
18. On October 23,2006, the Appeals Board recognized that the language, as interpreted, 
was contrary to the factual evidence, but nonetheless denied the Motion for Review, 
asserting that neither it had no authority to correct the mistake. (Rec. 460-463). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Session's September 23, 2005 Order specifically incorporates the parties' 
Stipulation, which determined that the Petitioner was temporarily totally disabled for 9.14 
weeks (64 days). However, despite the incorporation of the Stipulation, Clausing asserted 
that other language in the Order entitles her to Temporary Total Disability compensation for 
263.57 weeks (1,845 days), weeks when she was admittedly not temporarily totally disabled. 
Clausing's argument was entirely based on a isolated interpretation of one provision 
of the Order genetically awarding Temporary Total Disability since the accident occurred. 
Court orders, however, are to be interpreted as a whole and not in isolation. The Order 
should have been interpreted as a whole, while considering the other language in the Order, 
the undisputed facts in this case, and the law. It was error not to do so. Further, although the 
Appeals Board appears to have recognized the error, it likewise erred in not correcting the 
incorrect interpretation. 
Additionally, Clausing was improperly awarded Temporary Total Disability 
purportedly incurred during a period for which all claims have been settled. The parties 
originally entered a settlement agreement in January 2002. That settlement agreement was 
judicially confirmed in an order dated October 22,2002. Despite this settlement agreement 
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and court order, Judge Sessions nonetheless awarded Temporary Total Disability for the time 
period prior to October 22,2002. Settlement principles and res judicata principles preclude 
any recovery in this action for any damages incurred prior to October 22,2002. The Appeals 
Board again erred in not correcting this violation of law. 
Further, Clausing's present interpretation is admittedly contradictory to her 
understanding of Judge Session's September 23, 2005 Order when it was issued. The 
Affidavit of Clausing's attorney admits that the present interpretation is being argued solely 
to collect money to which she is not entitled. Clausing's own pleadings likewise contradict 
the present interpretation of the September 23, 2005 Order. Also, Clausing's interpretation 
of the September 23, 2005 Order is directly contradictory to Utah statutory law. 
Judge Sessions and the Appeals Board both erred in not granting the Appellant's 
motion for relief. The Appeals Board held that the Appellant's recourse was limited to a 
Motion for Review filed within 30 days of the September 23,2005 order. It held as a matter 
of law that a Rule 60(b) motion, or its equivalent, was not allowed under the Administrative 
Rules. The Appeals Board's holding is contradicted by both Utah statutory law and case law, 
which not only provides for the filing of motions in addition to a Motion for Review, but 
specifically holds that Rule 60 motions are appropriate in administrative proceedings. The 
Appellant's motion for relief was timely and should have been granted. 
ARGUMENT 
The facts of this case make clear that: 1) the parties reached a settlement on January 
14, 2002, resolving all claims as of that date; 2) Judge Eblen entered an October 22, 2002 
Order judicially resolving all claims as of that date and making the principle of res judicata 
applicable; 3) the July 2003 request for Temporary Total Disability was limited to "misc. 
dates," both unworked and unpaid, between October 22, 2002 and no later than June 10, 
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2004; 4) Clausing worked for the overwhelming majority of days from October 22, 2002 to 
June 10,2004; 5) the dispute regarding the meaning of the September 23,2005 Order did not 
arise until December 1, 2005 when Clausing made her demand for $123,061.20; and 6) 
Clausing is intentionally misinterpreting the September 23,2005 Order in an effort to obtain 
more money than justified or warranted. 
Under these circumstances, there is no justification, either under law or the facts, for 
an award to Clausing of either $123,061.20 or $183,561.85 for Temporary Total Disability 
compensation. The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission admitted that the evidence does 
not support Clausing's intentional misinterpretation, but incorrectly determined that the 
misinterpretation could not be corrected. Utah law, however, empowered both Judge 
Sessions and the Appeals Board, to correct such misinterpretations and errors, as requested 
by the Appellant. 
I. CLAUSING'S INTENTIONAL MISINTERPRETATION OF THE ORDER 
CONTRADICTS THE ORDER ITSELF. 
When it issued its September 23, 2005 Order, Judge Sessions knew, but perhaps 
overlooked, that Clausing had worked exactly as set forth in the Stipulation. In fact, Judge 
Sessions cited to, incorporated, and attached the Stipulation to its September 23,2005 Order. 
With this knowledge, Judge Sessions issued his September 2005 Order, specifically stating: 
9. Petitioner is awarded temporary total disability compensation from 
March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004. The applicable computation rare is 
$487.00 per week. 
14. [Appellant] is permitted an offset for amounts previously paid by 
[Appellant] in all areas of this award. 
(Rec. 151-154). 
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A. Orders Are Interpreted as a Whole, and Not in Isolation. 
First, the Order, by incorporating and attaching the Stipulation, specifically and clearly 
limits the possible Temporary Total Disability compensation to the few non-working dates 
set forth in the Stipulation. Second, the possible Temporary Total Disability compensation 
is also expressly limited by the "offset" language contained in paragraph 14 of the Order. 
Clausing's isolated interpretation of paragraph 9 cannot be reconciled with the incorporated 
Stipulation or paragraph 14. 
Under Utah law, orders are interpreted just as contracts. In Culbertson v. Bd. of 
County Commissioners. 44 P.3d 642, 648 (Utah 2001), the Supreme Court held: 
We construe an ambiguous order under the rules that apply to other legal 
documents. Specifically, we look to the language of the order, and we "(may) 
resort... to the pleadings and findings. Where construction is called for, it is 
the duty of the court to interpret an ambiguity (in a manner that makes) the 
judgment more reasonable, effective, conclusive, and (that) brings the 
judgment into harmony with the facts and the law." 
Clausing interprets paragraph 9 in complete isolation from the remaining paragraphs, the 
Stipulation, the pleadings, and the circumstances. Such an interpretation is contrary to well 
established law which holds that legal documents are not to be interpreted in isolation. 
Rather, they are to be interpreted "in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties, 
looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature, and purpose of the 
contract." Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 2000)(Emphasis added). 
The September 23, 2005 Order contains an explicit provision incorporating the 
Stipulation and Clausing's work history. It likewise contains an explicit provision allowing 
Appellant to offset any Temporary Total Disability compensation by amounts already paid. 
Although these provisions of the Order are ignored by Clausing's interpretation, under Utah 
law they must be considered in interpreting paragraph 9. When these provisions are 
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considered, Clausing's isolated interpretation of paragraph 9 of the Order is directly 
contradicted. 
B. Harsh and Unreasonable Interpretations Should Not Be Enforced. 
As explained in further detail below, if Clausing's interpretation were to be allowed, 
it would not only contradict the other provisions of the Order, but would also violate double 
recovery prohibitions, res judicata principles, settlement principles, stipulation principles, the 
Temporary Total Disability compensation laws, and directly contradict the admitted facts and 
evidence on the record. Such a harsh and unreasonable result should not be allowed. 
[W]here there is doubt about the interpretation of a contract, a fair and 
equitable result will be preferred over a harsh and unreasonable one. And an 
interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only 
where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no 
other reasonable interpretation to be given it. 
Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 2000). The fair and equitable result would be to 
correctly interpret the Order as a whole, thereby giving meaning to the entire Order, and 
assuring that the Order corresponded with the record, the facts, and the law. 
C. Orders Should Be Construed as Intended by the Parties, 
Moreover, Utah law makes clear that a contract or an order should be construed as 
intended by the parties involved. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp.. 48 P.3d 918, 925 (Utah 
2002). As explained below, the award of the amounts now demanded by Clausing would 
contradict Utah statutory and case law. The parties clearly did not intend that law should be 
violated by the Order. Even if the parties had intended the law to be violated, an illegal order 
is still void under the law. Baker v. Latses, 206 P. 553, 555 (Utah 1922). 
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i. Clausing Admits Her Intepretation Does Not Reflect Her Intent 
the Facts, or the Law. 
Further, Clausing's own intent in entering the Stipulation, and her true beliefs 
regarding the Order are admitted in the Affidavit of Dawn Atkin, Clausing's attorney: 
Upon receipt of the Order of September 23, 2005, I noted that the order 
provided for TTD benefits for the entire period of March 18,1999 to June 10, 
2004, at $487.00 per week and realized that was not in keeping with the 
Stipulation for a Medical Panel which the parties had previously executed in 
February of 2005. I anticipated a post-Order motion or a timely appeal. 
(Rec. 393-394). Clausing freely admits that her present interpretation of the September 23, 
2005 Order directly contradicts her true intent in entering the Stipulation. She freely admits 
that her isolated interpretation of paragraph 9 of the Order is directly contradicted by another 
portion of the Order, the incorporated and attached Stipulation. She admits that she knew 
her interpretation of the Order was wrong, and even expected the Appellant to file a "post-
Order motion or timely appeal." (No such motion or appeal was filed at the time because the 
Appellant, in contrast to Clausing, interpreted the Order as a whole and based on the admitted 
and stipulated facts and circumstances). 
An interpretation that admittedly contradicts the order interpreted, cannot be allowed. 
ii. Clausing's Demand Violates the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
Clausing freely admits that her demand is not based on the Stipulation, the facts, or 
the law, but rather, merely on the fact that the ambiguous Order purportedly allows room for 
such a demand. Clausing admits that she is merely taking advantage of what she views as 
a fortuitous mistake. She therefore, contends that it is just and proper to force the Appellant 
to pay at least $183,561.85 to Clausing, none of which the Appellant should pay, and none 
of which Clausing should receive. 
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Such a demand violates Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 
By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the cour t . . . an 
attorney . . . is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry under the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose . . . ; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses and other legal contentions therein are warranted 
by existing law . . . , 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support 
Clausing is attempting to collect $183,561.05 to which she is not entitled, and therefore, is 
attempting to accomplish an improper purpose. Her demand is admittedly not warranted by 
law or the facts. The demand, therefore, is made in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
In addition, Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that "a lawyer shall 
not bring . . . a proceeding, or assert. . . an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and 
fact for doing so."" Clausing knows and admits that her demand has no basis in law. The 
Comment to Rule 3.1 states further that "the advocate has . . . a duty not to abuse the legal 
procedure." She knows that her interpretation of the Order, if followed, would make the 
Order contrary to the evidence and the law. She is knowingly misusing ambiguous language, 
and thereby, abusing legal procedure. 
II. CLAUSING'S INTENTIONAL MISINTERPRETATION OF THE ORDER 
CONTRADICTS THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD. 
As stated above, orders are to be interpreted "in light of the reasonable expectations 
of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature, and 
purpose of the contract." Peirce v. Peirce. 994 P.2d 193,198 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, in addition to the "whole" of the Order itself, the court must consider all of the 
circumstances, including facts that: A) as of January 14,2002 all Temporary Total Disability 
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claims were settled; B) as of October 22, 2002, all Temporary Total Disability claims were 
judicially resolved; C) all post October 22, 2002 Temporary Total Disability claims were 
limited by the stipulated work dates; D) all Temporary Total Disability claims extended only 
to the "misc. dates" up to the MMI date, which was prior to April 12, 2004; E) Temporary 
Total Disability is only payable for eligible unworked dates; and F) Clausing admits that the 
interpretation is contrary to the facts and evidence on the record. 
A. All Pre-January 14,2002 Temporary Total Disability Claims Are Barred 
by Settlement. 
As stated in the Facts section of this Brief, Clausing originally brought Temporary 
Total Disability claims arising from the March 18, 1999 accident in February 2001. The 
matter was litigated and a settlement was entered on the record at the hearing on January 14, 
2002. While a transcript of the January 14, 2002 hearing is not available because the 
recording has been lost (Notice Regarding Request for Transcript, on file with the Appeals 
Court, dated January 18,2007), the content of the settlement was set forth in Judge Eblen's 
October 22, 2002 Order. Clausing settled her claims in return for payment of 8 lA% 
permanent partial disability, and medical expenses, both past and ongoing. These amounts 
were paid by Appellant. In Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust, Co., v. Travelsted, 592 P.2d 605, 
607 (Utah 1979), the court reiterated longstanding law that: 
Settlements are favored in the law, and should be encouraged, because of the 
obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also to the judicial 
system. An expeditious means of enforcing a settlement agreement is 
conducive to this policy of law in that it adds the presence of judicial finality 
to the agreement, insuring that the goals of the parties as expressed in the 
agreement can be speedily attained. 
Settlements are to be enforced by the courts. Id. The settlement entered by the parties on 
January 14, 2002 resolved Clausing's Temporary Total Disability claims as of that date. 
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Judge Eblen's subsequent letter to Clausing confirmed that all matters were indeed resolved. 
(Rec. 371). Clausing is, therefore, prohibited from now being awarded any pre-January 14, 
2002 Temporary Total Disability compensation. It should be remembered that Clausing did 
not even claim any Pre-January 2002 Temporary Total Disability in July 2003 Application. 
Lacking any basis for awarding pre-January 14, 2002 Total Temporary Disability, 
paragraph 9 of the September 23,2005 Order was reasonably interpreted as providing merely 
a generic window from the injury date to the latest possible MMI date, from which any 
eligible, unworked and unpaid dates might possibly be found. That Clausing would, in spite 
of her knowledge of the settlement, decide to dispute this reasonable interpretation was not 
known until December 1,2005. Despite this dispute, the settlement is sufficient to invalidate 
any pre-January 14, 2002 Temporary Total Disability claims. 
It must be remembered that the Appellant paid all temporary compensation benefits 
to Clausing prior to the January 14,2002 hearing. This amount was stipulated by the parties 
and totaled $5,162.66. (Rec. 404-405). 
B. All Pre-October 22,2002 Temporary Total Disability Claims Are Barred 
by Res Judicata. 
As stated in the Facts section and Section IA of this Brief, Clausing originally brought 
Temporary Total Disability claims arising from the March 18, 1999 accident in February 
2001. The matter was litigated and a settlement was entered on the record at the hearing on 
January 14, 2002. Judge Eblen then entered a final order dated October 22, 2002 
incorporating the settlement and resolving the matter. The October 22, 2002 Order awards 
Clausing 8/4% permanent partial disability, and medical expenses, including ongoing 
expenses. The October 22, 2002 Order fully resolved all pending matters between the 
parties. 
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L Claim Preclusion Bars All Pre-October 22,2002 Temporary Total 
Disability Claims. 
Res Judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
For claim preclusion to apply, three requirements must be met: (1) The 
subsequent action must involve the same parties, their privies, or their assigns 
as the first action, (2) the claim to be barred must have been brought or have 
been available in the first action, and (3) the first action must have produced 
a final judgment on the merits of the claim. 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc.. 110 P.3d 678, 686 (Utah 2005). As for 
requirement (1), the 2001 Application and the 2003 Application involve the same Petitioner, 
Clausing, as well as the same Respondents, Frito-Lay and Transcontinental Insurance. As 
for requirement (2), not only were Temporary Total Disability claims available when the 
2001 Application was filed, but the claims were actually brought by Clausing. As for 
requirement (3), a final judgment on the merits was issued on October 22, 2002. The 
October 22, 2002 Order confirms that it is final by including the "Notice of Appeal Rights." 
Further, under UCA 34A-2-801(2), 
Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an administrative law judge 
in accordance with Subsection (3), the decision of an administrative law judge 
on an application for hearing filed under Subsection (1) is a dinal order of the 
commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued. 
All pre-October 22, 2002 Total Temporary Disability claims are barred by the claim 
preclusion branch of the principle of res judicata. 
ii. Issue Preclusion Bars All Pre-October 22, 2002 Temporary Total 
Disability Claims, 
The second branch of res judicata is Issue Preclusion. Its four requirements are: 
(1) The party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party 
to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (2) the issue decided in 
the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant 
action; (3) the issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and 
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fairly litigated; and (4) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits. 
As stated above, the parties to the two actions are the same, thereby fulfilling requirement 
(I). As for requirement (2), Temporary Total Disability for the period from March 18,1999 
until October 22,2002 is the identical issue resolved in the earlier action. As to requirement 
(3), Temporary Total Disability was completely, fully and fairly litigated in the first action, 
and confirmed by the October 22, 2002 judicial act. All pre-October 22, 2002 Temporary 
Total Disability claims made, were paid. There were no outstanding claims not resolved by 
the January 14,2002 settlement and October 22,2002 Order. Which leads us to requirement 
(4), and as stated above, there is no dispute that the October 22, 2002 Order was final, and 
therefore, appealable under UCA 34A-2-801(2). 
All pre-October 22, 2002 Temporary Total Disability claims are barred because the 
issue has already been litigated and resolved by the Judge Eblen's October 22, 2002 Order. 
C. Clausing's Temporary Total Disability Demand Directly Contradicts 
Clausing's Stipulated Work Dates. 
Clausing's demand for $123,061.20, and subsequent demand for $183,561.85, not 
only violates the Order as a whole and res judicata principles, but it also contradicts the 
Stipulation entered by the parties in February 2004. The Stipulation contains a 
comprehensive list of all dates not worked by Clausing from March 18, 1999 to June 10, 
2004. 
Out of the 272.71 weeks (1,909 days) between March 18,1999 and June 10,2004, the 
grand total Clausing did not work was 51.86 weeks (363 days), of which 42.71 weeks (299 
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days) were not worked because Clausing was laid off, and not because she was disabled. 
However, despite being prevented from working for a maximum of 9.14 weeks (64 days), 
Clausing's December 1,2005 demand for $123,061.20 was based 190.88 weeks (1,336 days) 
at $487.00/week, plus interest. This is an admitted overstatement of 181.74 weeks (1,272 
days). 
The total amount Temporary Total Disability compensation owed from March 18, 
1999 to June 10, 2004 was $4,451.18 (9.14 weeks x $487.00). Moreover, when Clausing 
made the December 1,2005 demand for $ 123,061.20, she admitted already having been paid 
Temporary Total Disability compensation of $6,136.00. The two demands for $123,061.20 
and$183,561.85 directly contradict Clausing's stipulated work dates. The demands bear no 
relation to fact, and are merely opportunistic, self-serving demands founded on the isolated 
(mis)interpretation of paragraph 9 of the September 23, 2005 Order. 
D, Clausing's Temporary Total Disability Demand Directly Contradicts 
Clausing's Own Pleadings. 
Not only does demand for Temporary Total Disability compensation directly 
contradict the stipulated work dates, it also contradicts Clausing's own pleadings. First, the 
July 2003 Application does not state any dates for which Total Temporary Disability was 
claimed to be owed. Second, Clausing's Pre-hearing Disclosures indicates only that certain 
"misc. dates missed after surgeries or for treatment prior to MMI." Third, Clausing admits 
that MMI was reached prior to the Pre-hearing Disclosure date of April 12, 2004. Fourth, 
those "misc. dates missed after surgeries or for treatment" are specifically set forth in the 
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February 2004 Stipulation, and as mentioned above, they come to a grand total of 64 days 
or 9.14 weeks. 
Clausing's pleadings did not seek the relief she now demands. It was error, therefore, 
for the Labor Commission to grant relief never requested or without evidentiary support. 
[I]t is error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and 
unsupported by the record. The trial court is not privileged to determine 
matters outside the issues of the case, and if he [or she] does, his [or her] 
findings will have no force or effect. In law or in equity, a judgment must be 
responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial court has no 
authority to render a decision on issues not presented for determination. Any 
findings rendered outside the issues are a nullity. 
Hilton Hotel v. Indus Comm'n, 897P.2d 352, 356 (Utah App. 1995). The orders of Judge 
Sessions and the Appeals Board awarding Temporary Total Disability from the date of the 
injury should be rejected. 
E. Clausing's Temporary Total Disability Demand Violates Utah Statutory 
Law and Case Law. 
Clausing's interpretation of the Order also contradicts statutory law, and therefore, 
should not be enforced. The statutory purpose of Temporary Total Disability compensation 
is to compensate a party for being deprived of the ability to work because of a work related 
injury. UCA34A-2-410(l)(a) allows Clausing $487.00 per week of temporary compensation, 
but only "so long as the disability is total." The statutes do not allow $487.00 per week for 
anything other than total disability. By stipulation, Clausing's total disability was limited to 
9.14 weeks, or 64 days, between March 18,1999 and June 10,2004. To order any more than 
9.14 weeks violates UCA 34A-2-401(l)(a). "[E]very contract [or order] in violation of law 
is void." Baker v. Latses, 206 P. 553, 555 (Utah 1922). 
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Second, even if the September 23, 2005 Order did not violate statutory law as 
interpreted by Clausing, the fact remains that such an interpretation violates longstanding 
case law. Neither contracts nor orders should be interpreted in a way that would make them 
illegal. "[0]ur courts will not lend their aid to the enforcement of nor permit a recovery of 
compensation under, contracts made and entered into in violation of the law prohibiting them 
or declaring them to be unlawful." Baker v. Latses, 206 P. 553, 555 (Utah 1922). Clearly, 
contract law forbids a contract, or order, from being interpreted in a way that would violate 
the law. Yet, that would be the precise result if Clausing's interpretation of the September 
23, 2005 Order is accepted. 
F. Clausing's Temporary Total Disability Demand Contradicts Her Own 
Admissions. 
As described in more detail above, Dawn Atkin, Clausing's attorney, admits that the 
Order, as Clausing interprets it, is contrary to the Stipulation, and therefore, the Order itself. 
She admits that paragraph 9, if read isolated from the rest of the Order, "was not in keeping 
with the Stipulation." She admits further that if the Appellant had interpreted the Order as 
Clausing did, Clausing "anticipated a post-Order motion or a timely appeal" to correct the 
Order. (Rec. 393-394). 
III. JUDGE SESSIONS AND THE APPEALS BOARD WERE FULLY 
AUTHORIZED, AND OBLIGATED, TO GRANT THE RELIEF REQUESTED, 
AND THEREFORE ERRED IN NOT DOING SO. 
The Appellant filed a motion requesting relief regarding the September 23, 2005 
Order. Judge Sessions, however, rejected the motion, asserting that the motion was 1) 
improper in that it was not a Motion for Review, 2) it was not filed within 30 days of the 
Order; and alternatively, 3) the Order was not based on a default. (Rec. 298-300). Judge 
-23-
Sessions was legally and factually unjustified in basing its denial on each of these three 
points. 
The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission then upheld the denial of the 
Appellant's motion, again holding that the motion was improper as it was not a Motion for 
Review, and was not filed within 30 days of September 23, 2005. (Rec. 460-463). 
Specifically, the Appeals Board held that a Rule 60(b) motion, or its equivalent, was not 
allowed under the Administrative Rules. Like Judge Sessions, the Appeals Board's basis 
for denial was error. 
A. The Appellant's Motion for Relief Was Proper and Should Have Been 
Allowed. 
The October 24, 2006 Appeals Board denial of relief states that the Appellant "had 
a remedy readily available: it could have requested Commission or Appeals Board review of 
[Judge Session's September 23,2005 Order]... within the 30-day period permitted for filing 
requests for review." (Rec. 462). Consequently, despite the fact that the Appeals Board 
recognized the award of Temporary Total Disability compensation was unjustified, it held 
that it had no authority to correct the decision. Not only was the Appeals Board factually 
incorrect in holding that a Motion for Review was "readily available, but its decision was 
legally improper because it limits permissible post-order motions, in administrative 
proceedings, to Motions for Review only. This limitation is not warranted by Utah 
administrative law, statutory law, or case law. 
i. The Appeals Board Decision Is Contradicted by UCA 63-46b-13. 
First, the Appeals Board's order restricting post-order motions is contradicted by UCA 
63-46b-13, which specifically allows "any party [to] file a written request for reconsideration 
with the agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested" within 20 days 
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of the date of the order. The statutes make clear that Motions for Review are not the only 
permissible post-order motions. The Appeals Board, as well as Judge Session, both erred in 
not recognizing the Appellant's rights under this statute. 
ii. The Appeals Board Decision Is Contradicted by Utah Case Law, 
Second, the Appeals Board's order is contradicted by Utah case law. In Career Serv. 
Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corrections. 942 P.2d 933,945 (Utah 1997), the Supreme Court 
reiterated that "inherent in the power to make an administrative decision is the authority to 
reconsider a decision." The court explained that even in " the absence of specific authority 
in the governing statutes,... every tribunal has some power to correct its own mistakes." Id. 
It is clear, therefore, that under Utah case law, the Labor Commission had the authority to 
correct its mistakes, even absent a specific statute. The Appeals Board erred in holding 
otherwise. 
iii. The Appeals Board Decision Is Contradicted by UCA 34A-2-420. 
Third, under UCA 34A-2-420(l) "[t]he powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing." More specifically, the statute states that "[a]fter notice 
and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board . . . may from 
time to time modify or change a former finding or order from the commission." There is no 
dispute that the Labor Commission had continuing authority and jurisdiction. Consequently, 
the Appeals Board clearly erred in determining that relief could not be granted, first by Judge 
Sessions, and second, by the Appeals Board. (Rec. 462). 
In Paulsen v. The Industrial Commission. 770 P.2d 125,130 (Utah 1989) the Supreme 
Court determined that the continuing jurisdiction statute "gives the Commission broad 
authority to make substantive changes in its orders when substantial changes in the 
circumstances occur." The court also determined that in addition to substantive changes, the 
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Commission was fully authorized under this statute to make any necessary clerical changes 
to its orders. See. Id. Importantly, there are no time limits during which these changes can 
be made, as long as continuing jurisdiction exists. See. Id. Again, the Labor Commission 
had continuing jurisdiction, and therefore, was fully authorized to make both substantive and 
clerical changes to the September 23,2005 Order. The Appeals Board erred in determining 
that no such authority exists. 
Further, as the facts set forth above show, the result of the Appeals Board's October 
24,2006 Order is not supported by the evidence and facts. The Appeals Board freely admits 
that it "is aware that [the September 23, 3005 Order] may have awarded excess temporary 
total disability compensation," but it nonetheless denied relief based on a procedural 
technicality. This was another was error. "[T]he legislature has directed that workers' 
compensation proceedings are not to be burdened with technicalities but are to be conducted 
so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties within the spirit of the workers' 
compensation statutes." Id. The substantial rights of the parties are not served by forcing the 
Appellant to pay over $ 180,000.00 to Clausing, none of which the Appellant is liable for, and 
none of which Clausing is entitled to. 
iv. Rule 60 Motions Are Permitted in Administrative Proceedings. 
The Appeals Board specifically asserted that no Rule 60(b) motion, or presumably its 
equivalent, is allowed in administrative proceedings. That holding was likewise error. In 
Paulsen, the Supreme Court has held that "the authority of the Commission to correct clerical 
eiTors under section [34A-2-420] is comparable to that provided to trial courts by Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(a)" Id. The Commission's authority to make substantive changes, 
which is also undisputed, is comparable to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and allowed 
in administrative proceedings. Were it otherwise, the clarification of ambiguous 
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administrative orders, the correction of clerical or substantive errors, the consideration of 
newly discovered evidence, and numerous other bases for relief would not exist in 
administrative proceedings. There is no reason why litigants in civil court warrant such 
protections, but litigants in administrative proceedings do not. Moreover, by eliminating 
these bases for relief, the Appeals Board ignores the legislature's intent to make 
administrative proceedings more flexible and informal than civil proceedings. See Paulsen 
v. The Industrial Commission. 770 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah 1989); Pitcher v. Dep't of Social 
Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983). 
Additionally, the court in Paulsen stated that "[c]ases interpreting rule 60(a) maybe 
referred to in elaborating on the Commission's authority." Paulsen, at 130. If Rule 60 
principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, certainly cases interpreting Rule 60 
would have no relevance to such proceedings. Yet they do, and for good reason, Rule 60 
principles apply in administrative proceedings. 
Further, in Bowen Trucking v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 559 P.2d 954 (Utah 1977), a 
Rule 60 motion was filed in an administrative proceeding, the administrative agency granted 
relief on the motion, and the Supreme Court affirmed. It is clear under Utah case law, that 
administrative proceedings allow Rule 60 motions, or their equivalent. 
Even if "Rule 60" motions were not allowed, the Appellant's motion for relief was 
still appropriate. It is longstanding law that motions are to be considered based on their 
substance, not their title or designation. See Gillett v. Price, 135 P.3d 861, 863 (Utah 2006); 
Howard v. Howard, 356 P.2d 275 (Utah 1960). The Appellant's motion for relief, though 
designated as a "Rule 60" motion, should likewise be considered according to its content. 
Its content makes it akin to a Rule 60(b) motion, and as such, under Paulsen, it is allowed in 
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administrative proceedings. In addition, the Appellant's motion for relief is statutorily 
allowed under UCA 63-46b-13 as a motion to reconsider. 
Moreover, in Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933 
(Utah 1997), the Supreme Court reiterated that Rule 60 provided a narrow exception to the 
general rule that a court should not reopen its judgment. The court then stated that "[t]his 
same limitation on district courts would apply to administrative agencies," and by 
implication, just as in district courts, exceptions may likewise be found under Rule 60 
principles in administrative proceedings. Id., at 949. 
B. The Appellant's Motion for Relief Was Timely, 
Having established that Rule 60 motions, and their equivalents, are allowed in 
administrative proceedings, the next question is whether the Appellant's motion for relief 
was timely. Judge Sessions and the Appeals Board both incorrectly held that the only 
possibility for relief was through a Motion for Review, and therefore, must have been filed 
within 30 days of September 23, 2005. They erred on both points. 
i. The Appellant's Motion for Relief Was Timely as a Rule 60 
Motion, 
Inasmuch as Rule 60 motions are applicable in administrative proceedings, the time 
limitations contained in Rule 60 are likewise applicable in administrative proceedings. Rule 
60 does not limit such motions to 30 days after the order, but rather, states that "clerical 
mistakes" may be corrected "at any time," other mistakes, within "3 months," and for other 
reasons, "within a reasonable time." URCP Rule 60(a) and (b). The Appellant's motion for 
relief was filed on December 21, 2005, within the time allowed under Rule 60, and even 
within the most restrictive "3 month" deadline. 
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ii. The Appellant's Motion for Relief Was Timely as a Motion to 
Reconsider. 
Even if the Appellant's motion for relief were not a Rule 60 motion, it at least 
qualifies as a motion to reconsider, as allowed under UCA 63-46b-13, and as such, under the 
circumstances, was timely filed. UCA 63-46b-13 allows 20 days for a motion to reconsider, 
but those 20 days, as with any other similar deadline, do not begin to run until the 
controversy actually arises and becomes known. This is generally referred to as the 
discovery principle. 
As the facts show, Clausing did not make her unjustified demand based on her 
admitted misinterpretation of the Order until December 1, 2005. The controversy did not 
arise until December 1, 2005. "Where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in 
ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute 
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered." TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 
(2001). In Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981), the court followed explained 
and applied the discovery rule. In Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 
P.3d 646, 652 (Utah App. 2004), the court explained: 
Utah Supreme Court has recognized three situations in which the discovery 
rule applies: "(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; 
(2) in situations where the plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of 
action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) 
in situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action." 
See also. Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235 (Utah 1998); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 
86 (Utah 1981). This discovery rule is an equitable rule and is applicable in the case at bar, 
where Clausing's interpretation of the Order, which she admits is contrary to the evidence, 
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was concealed until December 1, 2005. Therefore, the Appellant's motion for relief, even 
if only considered a motion for reconsideration, was filed timely within the 20 days limitation 
period allowed by statute. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that a settlement agreement was entered into, and was judicially 
confirmed on October 22,2002. All claims for damages to that date are therefore precluded 
under basic settlement principles, as well as the principles of res judicata. Clausing also 
admits, as set forth in the Stipulation, that from the date of the accident, March 18, 1999, to 
at least June 10, 2004, she was temporarily totally disabled for a total of 9.14 weeks (64 
days). Under such facts, and under Utah law which limits Temporary Total Disability 
compensation to only those dates where the petitioner is totally disabled, it was improper for 
Judge Sessions and the Appeals Board to award Temporary Total Disability compensation 
for the entire period between March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004. 
The September 23, 2005 Order itself, when interpreted as a whole, taking into 
consideration the incorporated Stipulation, the admissions of the parties, and the other facts 
of the case, cannot support an award for either the $123,061.20 or $183,561.85 presently 
claimed by Clausing. Such an award directly contradicts the parties' January 2002 settlement 
agreement, the October 22,2002 Order, res judicata principles, the parties' Stipulation, Utah 
statutory law, and fundamental principles of equity. Judge Session's and the Appeals 
Board's refusal to correct the errors likewise violated administrative rules, Utah statutory 
law, case law, and Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Judge Session's and the Appeals Board's rulings should be reversed. 
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Respectfully submitted this 15th day of March, 2007. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
ZJT:-
"HEODORE E. M. KANELL 
JOHN H. ROMNEY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
RULES AND STATUTES: 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Ex 
UCA 34A-2-801(2): Ex 
UCA34A-2-410(l)(a) Ex 
UCA63-46b-13 Ex 
UCA 34A-2-420(l) Ex 
COPIES OF EXHIBITS: 
October 22, 2002 Order of Judge Eblen Ex 
Clausing's Pre-hearing Disclosures Ex 
Stipulation Ex 
September 23, 2005 Judge Sessions Order Ex 
Affidavit of Clausing's Attorney Ex 
October 23, 2006 Appeals Board Order Ex 
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I hereby certify that on the 15th day of March, 2007,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to the following: 
Allen L. Hennebold 
Utah Labor Commission 
PO Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
K. Dawn Atkin 
Atkin & Associates 
1111 Brickyard Road, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
^ w /.^yu^4^( 
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Tab A 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 60. Relief from j u d g m e n t or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such.mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may" be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could nbt have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic),, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
TabB 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 (2006) 
§ 34A-2-801. Initiating adjudicative proceedings — Procedure for review of administrative 
action 
(1) (a) To contest an action of the employee's employer or its insurance carrier concerning 
a compensable industrial accident or occupational disease alleged by the employee, any of 
the following shall file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) the employee; or 
(ii) a representative of the employee, the qualifications of whom are defined in rule by 
the commission. 
(b) To appeal the imposition of a penalty or other administrative act imposed by the 
division on the employer or its insurance carrier for failure to comply with this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, any of the following shall file an application for 
hearing with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) the employer; 
(ii) the insurance carrier; or 
(iii) a representative of either the employer or the insurance carrier, the qualifications of 
whom are defined in rule by the commission. 
(c) A person providing goods or services described in Subsections 34A-2-407(12) and 34A: 
3-108(12) may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-2-407 or 34A-
3-108. 
(d) An attorney may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-1-3Q9. 
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an administrative law judge in 
accordance with Subsection (3), the decision of an administrative law judge on an application 
for hearing filed under Subsection (1) is a final order of the commission 30 days after the 
date the decision is issued. 
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an administrative law judge by filing a 
motion for review with the Division of Adjudication within 30 days of the date the decision is 
issued. 
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests under Subsection (3)(c) that the 
appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review. 
(c) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the Appeals Board by filing 
the request with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) as part of the motion for review; or 
(ii) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for review, within 20 days 
of the date the motion for review is filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
(d) A case appealed to the Appeals Board shall be decided by the majority vote of the 
Appeals Board. 
(4) All records on appeals shall be maintained by the Division of Adjudication. Those records 
shall include an appeal docket showing the receipt and disposition of the appeals on review. 
(5) Upon appeal, the commissioner or Appeals Board shall make its decision in accordance 
with Section 34A-1-3Q3. 
(6) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the parties to any proceedings 
before it of its decision, including its findings and conclusions. 
(7) The decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is final unless within 30 days after the 
date the decision is issued further appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section or 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(8) (a) Within 30 days after the date the decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is 
issued, any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court 
of appeals against the commissioner or Appeals Board for the review of the decision of the 
commissioner or Appeals Board. 
(b) In an action filed under Subsection (8)(a): 
(i) any other party to the proceeding before the commissioner or Appeals Board shall be 
made a party; and 
(ii) the commission shall be made a party. 
(c) A party claiming to be aggrieved may seek judicial review only if the party has 
exhausted the party's remedies before the commission as provided by this section. 
(d) At the request of the court of appeals, the commission shall certify and file with the 
court all documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter together 
with the decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board. 
TabC 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-410 (2006) 
§ 34A-2-410. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — State average weekly wage 
defined 
(1) (a) In case of temporary disability, so long as the disability is total, the employee shall 
receive 66- 2/3% of that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury but: 
(i) not more than a maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week; and 
(ii) not less than a minimum of $ 45 per week plus $ 5 for a dependent spouse and $ 5 
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent 
children, not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, 
but not to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. 
(b) In no case shall the compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a period of 12 years from the 
date of the injury. 
(2) In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a 
fixed state of recovery, and when no light duty employment is available to the employee 
from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(3) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, shall be determined by the commission as follows: 
(a) On or before June 1 of each year, the total wages reported on contribution reports to 
the Unemployment Insurance Division for the preceding calendar year shall be divided by the 
average monthly number of insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers 
reported for the preceding year by 12. 
(b) The average annual wage obtained under Subsection (3)(a) shall be divided by 52. 
(c) The average weekly wage determined under Subsection (3)(b) is rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
(4) The state average weekly wage determined under Subsection (3) shall be used as the 
basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for: 
(a) injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease that occurred during the 
twelve-month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination; and 
(b) any death resulting from the injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease. 
TabD 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (2006) 
§ 63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review by the agency 
or by a superior agency under Section .63:46b--1_2 is unavailable, and if the order would 
otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is not a prerequisite for 
seeking judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one copy shall be 
mailed to each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue a written order 
granting the request or denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does not issue an order 
within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be 
considered to be denied. 
TabE 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420 (2006) 
§ 34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdiction of commission — No authority to change statutes of 
limitation — Authority to destroy records — Interest on award — Authority to approve final 
settlement claims 
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. 
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board 
in accordance with Part 8, Adjudication, may from time to time modify or change a former 
finding or order of the commission. 
(c) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of 
limitations contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(d) The commission may not in any respect change the statutes of l imitation referred to in 
Subsection ( l ) ( c ) . 
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than 
cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 34A-
2:417, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(3) Awards made by a final order of the commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% 
per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and 
payable. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 34A-2-_lj08_, an administrative law judge shall 
review and may approve the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final: 
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or 
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit 
entitlements under this chapter or Chapter 3 by means of a lump sum payment, structured 
settlement, or other appropriate payout. 
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Utah Labor Commission 
Adjudication Division 
Case No. 2001163 
AMY CLAUSING, 
* 
Petitioner, *
 R N D | N G S Q F F A C T 
CONCLUSIONS OF I A\ * 
vs. * AND ORDER ON 
FRITO-LAY and * STIPULATION OF PARTIES 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE, * 
* Judge Sharon , J. Eblen 
Respondents. * 
HEARING; January 14, 2002 at 1:00 p.m. in hearing room 332 of the Heber 
Wells Building in Salt Lake City, Utah. By Order and Notice of the 
Labor Commission. 
BEFORE: Sharon J. Eblen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARAMnPQ- The petitioner, Amy Clausing, was present arid represented 
by Timothy C. Allen, Attorney at Law. 
The respondents were represented by Theodore Kanell, 
Attorney at Law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner filed an application for hearing on February iz, ZOOI 
seeking compensation for knee injuries alleged to have occurred on March 18, 
1999. The petitioner amended her claim to include a low back ii ijury on October 
11, 2001. Respondent's admitted petitioner injured her knees, elbow and low 
back by accident as alleged. 
^ At the hearing, the petitioner was seeking a 5% permaner it partial 
disability award for her knee injury, a 1% permanent partiai disability award foi 
her left elbow injury, and a 5% permanent partial disability award for her low 
back and physical therapy. Respondents asserted that all medical providers 
treating the back injury had been paid and agreed the petitioner could get the 
physical therapy she sought to treat her back injury. Respondents further 
asserted that a 5% permanent partial disability award had been paid. 
At the hearing, the respondents agreed to pay an additional 3 1/2% 
permanent partial disability award for the petitioner's elbow and knee 
impairments. The respondents were to prepare and submit a compensation 
agreement to provide for the additional permanent partial disability award. No 
compensation agreement was prepared and submitted to the Labor Commission. 
On February 25, 2002, Attorney Allen reported that respondents have not 
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approved the medical care for the petitioner's low back injury that was 
recommended by Dr. Morgan and requested that the administrative law judge 
enter an order that reflected the stipulation of the parties on the record at the 
hearing on January 14, 2002. Accordingly, the Administrative Law Judge put 
this matter in line for an order. 
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner terminated Attorney Allen's services in this 
matter. On April 3, 2002, Attorney Allen filed notice that he is asserting a right to 
an attorney's fee in this matter based on his representation of the petitioner at 
the hearing. 
On September 9, 2002, the administrative law judge received a letter from 
the petitioner requesting that Mr. Allen not receive an attorney's fee for his 
representation of the petitioner in this matter. A copy of petitioner's letter was 
forwarded to Mr. Allen by the administrative law judge on September 10, 2002. 
On September 13, 2002, Mr. Allen responded noting that no order has been 
issued as a resuit of the hearing of January 14, 2002. He noted that the parties 
stipulated at the hearing that the petitioner had a 5 percent whole person 
impairment for her lumbar spine injury, a 2 1/2% impairment of the whole person 
for her left knee injury, and a 1% whole person permanent impairment for the left 
elbow injury. Mr. Allen noted that despite the respondent's agreement at the 
hearing to pay outstanding permanent partial disability compensation in the 
amount of 3 %%, no additional compensation has been paid by respondents. 
Mr. Allen noted that he followed up with respondent's counsel, Mr. Kanell, 
by telephone after the hearing regarding the status of the agreement to pay 
additional permanent partial disability and physical therapy visits, but no 
agreement was drafted by respondents as promised. Mr. Allen noted that as a 
result of his representation of the petitioner respondents agreed to pay additional 
permanent partial impairment of 3 1/2% of the whole person. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The petitioner was earning $900 a week and was married with two 
dependent children the age of 18 on March 18, 1999, the date of her injury. 
Thus, she qualifies for permanent partial disability compensation at the maximum 
rate of $339 per week. A 3 1/2% whole person permanent impairment is 
equivalent to 10.92 weeks of compensation, or $3,701.80, plus interest at 8 
percent per annum from the date of medical stability. 
Under the Labor Commission's attorney's fee rule, Attorney Allen is 
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entitled to receive $740.38 in attorneys' fees for the above award. Howev er , I le 
indicated he was willing to reduce his fee to $600 because of the delay 
encountered in resolving this matter. The preponderance of the evidence in the 
record indicates that Attorney Allen did what he could to •move the petitioner's 
case along, after the respondents failed to draft a compensation agreement to 
memorialize the stipulations made at the hearing. Attorney Allen generated 
compensation benefits in the amount of $3,701.88, plus interest 
The petitioner was medically stable on March 21, 2001, when ur. . .uwick 
provided a 5% whole person permanent impairment for the petitioner's right knee 
jniiirx/ for severe quadriceps atrophy. Exhibit ! 1 page 26. 
SI If :)I II A I E D 1 '••• • . ' 
At the hearing on Januai y 14, 2002, the parties agreed that the petitioi lei 
has a 2 1/2% whole person permanent partial impairment as result of her March 
18, 1999 knee injury. The parties further agreed that the petitioner has a 1 % 
whole person permanent impairment of her left elbow as a result of the industrial 
injury of March 18, 1999. These impairments are in addition to the 5% whole 
person permanent impairment that was paid by respondents and attributed to the 
low back injury at the hearing. 
The respondents agreed that physical therapy and ongoing medical care 
by Dr. Morgan is reasonably medically necessary to treat petitioner's industrial 
low back injury 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
Parties to Labor Commission proceedings may stipulate to facts u 
shorten proceedings. General Mills Inc. vs. Industrial Commission 105 F * I 
340(1940). 
/ \ M A I VQ1C; 
Permanent rauial Disability 
At the hearing in this matter petitioner and respondent agreed that the 
petitioner has a 2 1/2% whole person permanent partial impairment as result of 
her industrial knee injury of March 18, 1999. The parties further agreed to 
petitioner has a 1% whole person permanent partial impairment as result of her 
industrial left elbow injury of March 18, 1999. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled 
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to receive permanent partial disability compensation for 3 1/2% whole person 
permanent impairment in the amount of $3,701.88. 
Medical Expenses 
At the hearing in this matter, the petitioner and respondent agreed that the 
petitioner may receive additional medical care for her low back injury from Dr. 
Morgan. The parties further agreed that the physical therapy recommended by 
Dr. Morgan to treat petitioner's low back injury was medically necessary to treat 
the industrial injury. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The petitioner was injured by accident in the course and scope for 
employment with respondents on March 18, 1999. The petitioner injured her 
right knee, left elbow, and lumbar spine in the accident. The additional medical 
care recommended by Dr. Morgan treat petitioners iumbar spine injury, including 
physical therapy, is reasonably medically necessary to treat her industrial injury. 
The petitioner has a 3 1/2% whole person permanent impairment, in addition to 
the 5% permanent impairment already paid by respondents, as result of the 
industrial injury of March 18, 1999. Accordingly, she is entitled to receive an 
additional permanent partial disability award for her permanent impairment 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Frito-Lay and 
Transamerica Insurance shall pay the petitioner, Amy Clausing, permanent 
partial disability compensation for 3 1/2% permanent impairment, or $3,701.88, 
plus interest at 8 percent per annum from March 21, 2001. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, Frito-Lay and 
Transamerica Insurance shall pay all medical expenses reasonably medically 
necessary to treat the petitioners right knee, left elbow, and lumbar spine injuries 
caused by the industrial accident of March 18,1999. These medical expenses 
shall include payment for ongoing medical care by Dr. Morgan and physical 
therapy recommended by Dr. Morgan. Any medical bills that have been billed 
but not paid by respondents shall include interest of 8 percent per annum from 
the dates the charges were originally billed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, Frito-Lay and 
Transamerica Insurance shall pay the petitioner's attorney, Timothy C. Allen, an 
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attorney's fee in the amount of $600, plus 20% of the interest generated on the 
above award. Said attorneys' the shall be deducted from the aforesaid award 
and remitted directly to the office of Timothy C. Allen, Attorney at Law. 
DATED this pick day of October, 2002. 
Sharon J. Ebler/) 
Administrative caw Judge 
I JO ! ICE OF :APPEAI RIGI I I S 
Any party aggrieved by this decision may file a Motion For Review with 
the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion For Review 
must set forth the specific basis for review and must be received by the 
Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is signed. Other parties 
may then submit their Responses to the Motion For Review within 20 days of the 
date of the Motion For Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in 
the party's Motion For Review or its Response. If none of the parties specifically 
requests review by the Appeals Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah 
Labor Commissioner. 
00368 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on Stipulation of Parties was mailed, first-class, 
postage prepaid, on this 
22 day of October, 2002 to the following: 
AMY CLAUSING 1360 N 550 W WEST BOUNTIFUL UT 84087 
TIMOTHY C ALLEN PC 350 S 400 E #113 SALT LAKE CiTY UT 64111 
THEODORE KANELL ATTY 136 E S TEMPLE #1700 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
THE LABOR COMMISSION 
Nancy E Boling 
Support Specialist 
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ATKIN & ASSOCIATES 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
ADO * X OHflA K. DAWN ATKIN, ESQ. 
}A$"t\ i / - ' t r f v * 1111 BRICKYARD R O A D ' S U I T E 260-SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84106 
AREA C O D E 801 «TELEPHONE 52J-2552 
PLA^l/HRSSTENSEN FAX 478-0634 
CAMELL 
April 12, 2 004 
Hon. Sharon Eblen 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Adjudication Division 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Re: Amy Zacher-Clausing 
Prehearing Disclosures 
And Response to Respondent's Rule 60A Motion 
Case No. 2003892 
Hearing Date: May 2 6, 2 004 
Dear Judge Eblen: 
Please accept this letter as Petitioner's Prehearing 
Disclosures pursuant to Rule 602-2-1(1) (3) and our Response to 
Respondent's Rule 60A Motion for Correction of Clerical Error. 
1. Fact Witnesses: Petitioner will testify. 
2. Expert Witnesses: None. 
3. Language Translator: None. 
4. Exhibits: Medical Records Exhibit. 
October 22, 2202 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on Stipulation of Parties. 
Mileage Chart 
Medical Expenses Exhibit 
5. Benefits Claimed: 
a. wage rate: $900.00 per week 
b. dependants: married with 2 dependant children at the 
time of the accident 
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c. benefit rate: Pre July 1999 max: TTD $487, PPD $325. 
d. medical coverage: Medical expenses related to treatment 
of the neck. 
e. temporary total disability 
f . temporary partial disability 
g. permanent partial disability 
h. mileage 
i. interest 
6. Defenses: N/A 
7. Hearing Time: Less than four hours. 
8. Job Categories: N/A. 
9. Issues: 
a. By prior order causation issues involving the knees, 
elbow and low back have been resolved. The only injury at issue 
at this time is the neck. 
b. Medical Causation: This case involves a simple medical 
causation dispute. Petitioner was injured on March 18, 1999 when 
she injured her knees and low back. While recovering from 
reLated knee surgery, her knee gave out and she fell down some 
stairs. The resulting elbow surgery was paid as an industrial 
injury, but the resulting neck injury and related headaches have 
been denied. The denial is based on the IME report which states 
the neck is non-industrial because it was not reported as injured 
at the hospital visit after the fall. The treating physician, 
Dr. Robert Peterson, has stated that the neck was caused by the 
fall in his July 31, 2 003 letter and recommended surgery on May 
13, 2003. 
c. T/\Ie believe that the full payment of TTD and TPD was not 
paid after the various knee surgeries. However, there does not 
seem to be any dispute regarding the dates and we hope to have 
this issue resolved before the hearing. Similarly, we believe 
there was an additional 2% impairment rating after the latest 
surgery which has noc been paid. 
Petitioner is currently employed, so TTD/TPD claims inyft^V^U^ 
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only misc. dates missed after surgeries or for treatment prior to 
MMI. However, the MMI date is in dispute due to the dispute over 
the neck injury. Specifically, if the neck injury is industrial, 
petitioner is not at MMI. If the neck injury is not industrial, 
petitioner has reached MMI because she has reached MMI for all 
other injuries. 
d. Finally, in response to the Rule 60A Motion for 
Correction of Clerical Error, we agree that the proper PPD 
maximum rate for the March 18, 1999 is $325. However, we will 
let the Court determine if it is proper to correct the previous 
Order over a year after the Order was entered. 
KDA/d 
cc: Any Clausing 
Ted Kanell 
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K. Dawn Atkin, Esq. SB#6471 
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
1111 E. Brickyard Road, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 521-2552 
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IN THE LABOR COMMISSION OF OT£H % 
Amy Clausing 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Frito-Lay and/or 
Transcontinental Insurance 
Company 
Respondents, 
STIPULATION OF FACTS AND 
PROPOSED MEDICAL PANEL 
QUESTIONS 
CASE NO. 2003892 
Hon. Dale Sessions 
Comes now the petitioner, Amy Clausing, (hereinafter 
petitioner), by and through her attorney of record, K. Dawn Atkin 
and the Respondents, Frito~Lay and Transcontinental Insurance 
Company, through their attorney of record, Theodore E. Kanell. 
• The part-jresH-ieieby ayree arid stipulate to the following facts 
and questions for the Medical Panel. 
1. Amy Clausing, DOB 6/5/68, worked for Frito~Lay as a Route 
Sale Representative. Her job duties included servicing accounts by 
setting up displays of Frito-Lay products and restocking the 
displays as needed. This involved driving from store to store, and 
moving product from the back room of the store to the display. The 
heaviest lifting would involve 50 lb boxes of product, but such 
lifting was rare. More commonly boxes weighing 15 lbs were lifted. 
* * 1 S 1 * * * * 
» * * » t » * » 
* « * • * * 
» * t 2 * •
 3 * 
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Lifting overhead, squatting, kneeling and bending were required to 
• * * 9 
stock the shelves. * * • * » » # • 
• « * » 
* » « * * 
• * * » * 
• * « * » 
• » • * • * 
• » » « 2. On March 18, 1999 petitioner was in the back room of a 
• « 
s tore ge t t ing p'roduct to set up a display.** * A pa l l e t of 
» » » * • 
approximately 24 boxes of product stacked seven boxes high fell 
onto her. The cardboard boxes weighed 15 and 20 pounds each. 
Petitioner fell to the ground onto her hands and knees. She felt 
immediate pain in her knees and low back. 
3. On March 18, 1999 petitioner was earning $900.00. She was 
married with 2 children at the time of the accident. Petitioner 
was divorced on September 11, 2003. 
4. Transcontinental Insurance Company was the workers 
compensation insurance carrier for Frito-Lay on March 18, 1999. 
5. Related to her industrial knee problems, Petitioner had 
ongoing difficulty with her knee giving out. On May 21, 2000 
petitioner was at home walking down concrete stairs when she 
stepped down, the knee gave out and she f el 1 down the stair-s-
scrapping the left side of the body. She reported to Lakeview 
Hospital which noted "swelling and bruising of L shin. L shoulder 
abrasion, Pain in L shoulder, wrist and elbow with some swelling of 
L Elbow." (ME#1 pg 0338) Petitioner was diagnosed with a radial 
head fracture of the left elbow. (ME#1, pg 0343). 
6. By prior Order of the Court, Respondents are responsible 
for the March 18, 1999 industrial knee and low back injury. In 
2 
addition, by prior order of the Court, the May 21, 2000 fall was 
• * * * * * • * « * • 
caused by the industrial injury to ttjej kp*e£ 4^4, J thje.je*i?Qre, any 
« » * • • « s * c • 
* * » * * * t > * » 
injuries suffered in that fall are also the responsibility of the 
• » 
respondents. In accordance with the above Orders,•'respondents have 
» • 
• * • • • 
paid temporary total disability from August 17, 2000 to October 25, 
2000 in the amount of $5,090.00; January 2, 2001 in the amount of 
$72,66 and April 9, 2002 to April 22, 2002 in the amount of 
$974.00. In addition, permanent partial disability in the amount 
of $8,841.90 and medical expenses in the amount of $45,433.26 have 
been paid. 
7. After petitioner underwent surgery for her industrial knee on August 17, 2000, she noticed problems with facial droop and 
numbness. (ME#1, pg 0417) Petitioner reported problems related to 
paralysis on the right side including headaches, weakness of the 
right hand, slump in the right side of her smile and a sexual 
numbness. A mild stroke was suspected, however, other doctors 
attributed the problems to depression and anxiety (ME, pg 117). 
There is a medical question of the existence of a stroke, and if it 
occurred, was it causally related to the surgery. 
8. There is a medical record (ME#1, pg 0347) which states 
this accident occurred on a bicycle. The parties stipulate that 
this is an error. The parties stipulate that the petitioner did 
not suffer an injury on a bicycle. 
9. Petitioner first noticed neck pain in August 2000. She 
3 
made an appointment with Dr. Brian Morgan for September 21, 2000. 
» » * » *» * * • * * 
She reported stabbing neck pain at thit *fri*sijt I(8IE?#i,; £?g 0051), 
* * • « » « * » » « 
although the focus of treatment remained on her low back, knee and 
elbow pain. (ME#1, pg 0048). EMG revealed;* fcilateral C5-6 
polyradiculopathy. (ME#2, pg 8b) Dr. Robert G. Peterson has 
recommended a fusion surgery. (ME#2f pg 14) It i.s the opinion of 
the treating physicians that the neck injury was caused by the May 
21, 2000 fall. (ME#2, pg 15). Due to the Respondent's denial of 
coverage for the neck, the surgery has not been performed and, 
therefore, it is the opinion of the treating physicians that 
petitioner has not reached MMI for her neck. 
10. An IME was performed on January 27, 2 003 with Dr. Gerald 
R. Moress and Richard Knoebel with a review of the updated medical 
records performed on August 2, 2004. The IMEs found no medical 
causation for the neck injury and determined that fusion surgery is 
contra-indicated. Further they determined that no stroke occurred. 
The IMEs outlined stress
 f depressixin,—a^id—an^ie^y—r co-u-jrfe-ifrg—rrr 
somatiform disorder. (ME#2, pg 3.) In addition, the IMEs found no 
further medical treatment on the knee would be necessary. 
11. Petitioner reports difficulty lifting over 201b from the 
ground, or carrying over 401bs. Petitioner reports difficulty 
sitting for more than a few minutes without fidgeting in the chair 
due to numbness in the legs and pain in the back. However, if 
allowed to move in the chair, petitioner reports she can sit for an 
4 
» » 1 * * * * <«. 
t * * » * 1 
it » t * » * , 
• » -1 » > * 
* # » » » t * 4 » 
hour. Petitioner reports that she can walk for an hour. 
# * # * • • » e * * « 
Petitioner reports that the most comfbita#t5le po£i*tldn! f(5r her is 
9 9 9 • « * * * « « 
• * * * * • • » * » 
laying down in a fetal position, or on her stomach. Petitioner 
• » » 
reports she is not able to kneel or lift pver^ead. Petitioner 
# . « . . 
remains active and has worked since the accident. 
12. Petitioner continued to work for Frito-lay in a light 
duty capacity from 3/18/99 to 5/17/99 earning $400.00 per week. 
However, she was unable to perform her duties with Frito-Lay and 
the employment ended. Thereafter, petitioner continued to work in 
a light duty capacity as follows: 
5/8/99 petitioner started working with Orbit earning $11.48/hr: 
5/8/99 to 12/29/99 restricted to 20hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk 
12/30/99 to 1/10/00 (1st knee surgery) Unable to work. 
1/11/00 to 2/28/00 40hrs/week. Earned $456.00/wk 
2/29/00 to 4/30/00 restricted to 20hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk. 
5/1/00 to 5/20/00 40hrs/week $456.00/wk 
5/21/00 to 5/30/00 (1st elbow surgery) Unable to work. 
5/31/00 to 6/21/00 40hrs/week $456.00/wk. 
6/22/00 to 6/28/00 (2nd elbow surgery) Unable to work. 
6/29/00 to 8/16/00 40 hrs/week $456.00/wk 
8/17/00 to 9/11/00 (2nd knee surgery) Unable to work. 
9/12/00 to 10/2/00 restricted to 20hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk 
10/3/00 to 4/4/0? 4n h o " ^ / " " ^ ?^^ nn,/,.,.k . — 
4/5/02 to 4/18/02 (3rd Knee surgery - hardware removal) Unable 
to work. 
4/19/02 to 5/30/02 restricted to 20hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk 
5/31/02 to 10/19/02 40hrs/week $456.00/wk 
10/20/02 changed jobs to ISG earning $12.48/hr 
10/20/02 to 5/5/03 40hrs/week $499.20/wk 
5/5/03 Laid off from ISG. 
5/5/03 to 3/1/04 no work 
3/1/04 Began working at Pacific Rim earning $12.00/hr 
1/04 to 6/25/04 40hrs/week $480/wk 
5/25/04 laid off from Pacific Rim 
nm OQ 
6/25/04 to 9/14/04 no work 
* » * » * * 9 » 
* » * • * # • * • 4 * 
The p a r t i e s c r e a t e d t h i s s t ipu la t ion /oTi Se^tteftikfet *15, 2004. 
« « • » * * » » * * 
Temporary total or temporary partial disability thereafter will 
need to be addressed at a later date. 
13. There are unpaid medical expenses and mileage related to 
treatment ot the stroke, neck and knees. There are no factual 
disputes with medical bills or mileage. The parties agree that the 
medical bills and mileage which are reasonable and related to the 
injuries determined by the Panel to be industrially related shall 
be paid per workers compensation law. 
14. The disputes in this case involve the claimed stroke 
from the August 17, 2000 right knee surgery, medical causation of 
the neck injury, reasonableness of the proposed neck surgery, and 
whether additional medical care for the right knee is necessary and 
related to the industrial injury. 
15. A Medical Exhibit has been prepared by respondents for 
the Medical Panel. The Medical Exhibit includes two volumes. 
Medical Exhibit #1 includes 528 pages. Medical Exhibit #2 includes 
241 pages and contains the more recent medical records. Relevant 
films of the neck will be provided by the petitioner. 
16. All parties agree that the issues being presented to the 
Medical Panel are within the parameters of Utah Admin. Code R602-2-
2 and agree to have the Medical Panel address the disputes over 
medical causation and recommended treatment of the neck; medical 
6 
00110 
? * » * » * t t t 
* * » * * t * * 
t J * • , 3 
* i * * * » 1 j 
* # « * t S 
« * ft t » I I I t 
causation and diagnosis of the stroke symptoms; and treatment of 
the right knee. 
* • * » » • t > 
* * * * 9 * * * * *
 t 
* • * * * * » * » • 
* » » t # » S » * » 
» ' » t t S I S * * ft 
17. Al l p a r t i e s agree t o waive t h e i r r i g h t t o an e v i d e n t i a r y 
hear ing in t h i s m a t t e r . 
DATED t h i s ffi^day of ^JA/y ' 2004, 
/'' 
/ 
-*=*-
K. Dav^ n Atkin, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DATED t h i s r day of 2004, 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Attorney for Respondents 
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1. Did the May 21, 2000 fall cause or contribute to petitioner's neck problems? (If the answer is 
• * 
no, please skip to question number 6.) I . . . * *, 
2. If the May 21, 2000 fall medical caused the petitioner's neck problems, is the fusion surgery 
recommended by Dr. Peterson reasonable and related to the May 21, 2000 fall? 
3. If the fusion surgery is not reasonable, has petitioner reached MMI? 
4. If petitioner has reached MMI, what is the whole person impairment attributable to the May 21, 
2000 fall. Please outline any apportionment using Table V. 
5. If petitioner has not reached MMI, what medical treatment will be necessary for her to reach 
MMI. 
6. Did Petitioner suffer a stroke in connection with her August 17,2000 right knee surgery? Please 
explain as needed. 
7. Is the current recommended medical care for the right knee reasonable and related to the 
industrial injury? 
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801-530-6800 
AMY CLAUSING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FRITO-LAY and/or Transcontinental 
Insurance Company, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER TO CORRECT 
BENEFIT COMPUTATION OMISSION 
Case No. 2003892 
Judge Dale W Sessions 
THIS MATTER came before the Labor Commission when the parties filed a 
Stipulation of Facts and Proposed Medical Panel Questions which was filed with the 
Commission on February 10, 2005. Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Interim Order was 
issued February 10, 2005 by Dale W. Sessions, Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ"). 
The medical panel was held on 5 August 2005 and thereafter a report was issued 
concerning their findings. That report was received on August 19, 2005. The same day, a copy 
of the report was mailed to each counsel with an invitation to provide objections to the report 
within 15 days. Objections were received from Mr. Kanell, however they were beyond the 
deadline period. They are therefore not considered in regard to this opinion. A response to those 
objections was received thereafter from Ms. Atkin. Since she was responding to late objections, 
her response is not considered in this opinion. 
The ALJ having considered the matter and having reviewed both the stipulation and 
the medical panel report, now enters 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
in this matter as follows: 
1. Petitioner filed her Application for Hearing on September 5, 2003. Petitioner's 
claims included: medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation, 
temporary partial compensation, permanent partial compensation, travel expenses 
and interest. 
2. The parties each through counsel opted to present their case directly to a qualified 
medical panel through the existing procedures at the Labor Commission. 
Accordingly, they prepared a stipulation which included certain facts and panel 
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questions. A copy of that Stipulation is attached hereto and marked "Exhibit A." 
The information contained in that Stipulation is incorporated herein by this 
reference as if fully set forth here. 
3. The medical panel consisted of Dr.Alvin J. Wirthlin and Dr.Gllenn L. 
Momberger. Each of these physicians are qualified medical panel chair in their 
own right and are known to the Labor Commission for their careful and precise 
work. The panel report in this case is clear and helpful for a final determination 
to be made in resolving the issues presented in the Application for Hearing. The 
report is consistent with the medical records submitted. Most importantly, it is 
consistent with the Stipulation submitted by the parties. 
4. The report of the medical panel is incoiporated herein by this reference as if fully 
set forth here. A copy is attached to this opinion marked "Exhibit B." 
5. Petitioner was injured in the scope and course of her employment on March 18, 
1999 when a pallet of boxes fell on her. She was injured again when she fell 
down cement stairs on Mar 21, 2000. The findings of the medical panel focus on 
apportioning the results of the accidents to the present condition of Petitioner and 
will not be set out here. Instead, this Order includes the language and analysis in 
full by reference to the medical panel report itself. 
HAVING ENTERED Findings of Fact, the ALJ enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
in the matter as follows; 
6. Petitioner has met the burdens of both legal and medical cause as required in the 
case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
7. Petitioner should be entitled to workers compensation benefits related to her 
injury. 
8. Petitioner has been represented by counsel in this proceeding, and the attorney 
should be paid a fee according to the schedule promulgated by rule of the Labor 
Commission. 
the 
HAVING ENTERED Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the ALJ now enters 
ORDER 
of the Labor Commission as follows: 
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9. Petitioner is awarded temporary total disability compensation from March 18, 
1999 to June 10, 2004. The applicable computation rate is $487.00 per week. 
10. Petitioner is awarded permanent partial disability compensation at the 5% 
impairment established by the medical panel. The applicable rate is $325.00 per 
week. 
11. Petitioner is awarded medical costs and fees related to the March 18, 1999 injury 
and the injury of May 21, 2000 (if any). 
12. Petitioner is awarded 8% interest per annum on the amounts due from the time 
they became due until they are actually paid. 
13. Petitioner's attorney is awarded an attorney's fee according to the established 
scheduled of the Labor Commission. The attorney fee will attract interest at 8% 
until paid. The fee should be paid directly to Petitioner's attorney, K. Dawn 
Atkin, Esq., and shall be deducted from the amounts paid to Petitioner in this 
award. 
14. Respondent is permitted an offset for amounts previously paid by Respondent(s) 
in all areas of this award. 
15. Petitioner is awarded the right to receive and Respondent is hereby obligated to 
pay the RBRVS scheduled amounts for knee injections and future costs related to 
the treatment of her low back and right knee, including the 'traumatic arthritis' 
which may develop. 
16. Finally, Petitioner's claims related to stroke and cervical injury are expressly 
denied. 
DATED September L6, 2005. 
Dale S^zssions^/jy 
Administrative LaW Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
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decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on September 16, 2005, to the 
persons/parties at the following addresses: 
Amy Clausing 
2065 Sorento Dr. 
Woods Cross, UT 84087 
K. Dawn Atkin, Esq., 
1111 Brickyard Rd #206 
SLC, UT 84106 
Theodore Kanell Esq 
136 E S Temple Ste 1700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
ISSION 
Clerk, Adjudication Division 
PO Box 14e66JL5/ 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
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Gary E. Atkin, SB#0144 
K. Dawn Atkin, SB#6471 
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
1111 Brickyard Road, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 521-2552 
BEFORE THE UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
AMY C. CLAUSING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FRITO-LAY and/or 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR RELIEF 
Case No. 2003892 
Hon. Dale W. Sessions 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
COMES NOW K. Dawn Atkin, Esq. of the firm of ATKIN & 
ASSOCIATES, and, having been first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That I am the attorney for the Petitioner in the above-
entitled matter and, as their counsel, I am more familiar with the 
matters set forth in this Affidavit than said defendants would be. 
2. That I am an attorney, duly admitted to practice before 
the state and Federal Courts of Utah and, thereby, the Labor 
Commission of Utah. 
Upon receipt of the Order of September 23, 2005, I noted 
00393 
that the Order provided for TTD benefits for the entire period of 
March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004, at $487.00 per week and realized 
that was not in keeping with the Stipulation for a Medical Panel 
which the parties had previously executed in February of 2005. I 
anticipated a post-Order motion or a timely appeal. 
4. When the time for the post-Order motions or appeal 
expired, and no such motion or appeal had been received and no 
payment had been received either, I attempted to contact Mr. 
Kanell to secure payment. 
5. I left a voice message for Mr. Kanell on November 4, 
2005, noting that the payments owed on the Order were past due. 
His message had stated that he was out of town until November 9, 
2005, so I allowed additional time for response. 
6. When I received no response by November 18, 2005, I again 
called and left a voice message for Mr. Kanell indicating that 
payment needed to be made. Again, no response was received. 
7. On December 1, 2005, I again called to speak to Mr. Kanell 
and, when he was unavailable, asked to speak to his associate on 
this case, Andrew Wadsworth, Esq. I outlined the amounts which 
were due in accordance with the Stipulation, and explained that 
Petitioner would be willing to accept those amounts, 
notwithstanding the language of the Order, and indicated I would be 
sending a letter to Mr. Kanell confirming those amounts and 
2 
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petitioner's willingness to accept that payment. 
8. I subsequently prepared the letter of December 1, 2005 
(identified as Respondents' Exhibit 10) and forwarded it, together 
with the attached computations, to Mr. Kanell's office. The 
applicable dates for the amounts reflected in those computations 
were taken directly from the previous Stipulation for Medical Panel 
as jointly executed by the parties. 
9. On December 6, 2005, Mr. Kanell contacted me for the first 
time with regard to this Order and indicated that his client 
refused to pay the award and claimed the Order was barred by the 
prior Order of Judge Eblen. I explained that, if the amounts 
reflected were not paid by December 15, 2005, I would have no 
choice but to secure an abstract based on the full amount of the 
Order, because an Abstract can only reflect the actual amounts 
Ordered, not such amounts as counsel may feel should be reflected. 
10. When no payment was made by December 15, 2005, I then 
prepared the Abstract based upon the Order of September 23, 2005, 
and faxed copies to counsel for Respondents at the same time as the 
Abstract was forwarded to the Court. 
11. Contrary to respondent's assertions, I always understood 
the language of the Order to require payment of $487.00 per week 
for the entire period of March 18, 1999 to June 10, 2004. An order 
for time loss benefits was the expected result of the Medical 
3 00395 
Panel's determination of a June 10, 2004 MMI date. However, I 
understood that Order was not in keeping with the Stipulation of 
the parties and believed that the Court had made a mistake in 
Ordering Temporary Total Disability instead of a combination of 
Temporary Total Disability and Temporary Partial Disability. 
12. As reflected in my prior Response to Respondents' 
Objections to the Medical Panel Report, I have never been "aware 
that a prior order had resolved all claims through October 22, 
2002" and, as reflected in that Response, I disagree that the Order 
of Judge Eblen had any such effect. 
DATED thisJpPb_ day of January, 2006 
K. DawiT n, iLsa. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
STATE QF UTAH 
y 
A 
) 
ss, 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the '3^— day of January, 2006, personally appeared before 
me, K. Dawn Atkin, Esq., who, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
did state that she is the signer of the foregoing Affidavit, that 
she has read and understands the contents thereof, and that the 
statements contained therein are true and correct of her own 
knowledge, except as to such matters as are stated upon her own 
information and belief, and as to such matters, they are true to 
the best of her own information, knowledge and belief. 
My Commission Expires: ^/\/07-
NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing at: 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
I-' 
Notary Public 
. . .KEN ATKIN 
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APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
AMY CLAUSING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FRITO-LAY and TRANS-CONTINENTAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DISMISSING 
RESPONDENTS' RULE 60(b) 
MOTION 
Case No. 03-0892 
Frito-Lay and its insurance carrier, Trans-Continental Insurance Co. (referred to jointly as 
"Frito-Lay"), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law 
Judge Sessions' denial of Frito-Lay's motion, filed under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for relief from an award of benefits to Amy Clausing under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Ms. Clausing injured her knee and low back in a work accident at Frito-Lay on March 18, 
1999. In previous proceedings, the Commission determined that Ms. Clausing's injuries were 
compensable and awarded some medical and disability benefits. Ms. Clausing later filed a second 
claim requesting additional benefits for her injuries. 
After Ms. Clausing filed her second claim, she and Frito-Lay waived their right to an 
evidentiary hearing and instead submitted stipulated facts, including details of Ms. Clausing's work 
and earnings after her work accident. Judge Sessions accepted the stipulated facts and referred Ms. 
Clausing's claim to a medical panel. The panel concluded, among other things, that Ms. Clausing 
had reached medical stability from her work injuries on June 10, 2004. 
On September 23,2005, Judge Sessions issued his decision on the merits of Ms. Clausing's 
claim. The decision awarded temporary total disability compensation to Ms. Clausing for the entire 
period between her work accident and the date she reached medical stability, with no reduction for 
her work and earnings during that period. The decision also stated that any party dissatisfied by the 
decision could obtain review by either the Commissioner or Appeals Board by filing a request for 
review within 30 days. Neither party filed a request for review. Consequently, Judge Sessions' 
decision became final on October 24, 2005. 
Beginning on November 4,2005, Ms. Clausing's attorney placed several telephone calls to 
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one of Frito-Lay's attorneys and left messages requesting payment of Ms. Clausing's disability 
compensation. Frito-Lay's attorney did not return these calls. Finally, on December 1, 2005, Ms. 
Clausing's attorney actually got through to another of Frito-Lay's attorneys. In this telephone 
conversation, Ms Clausing's attorney pointed out that Judge Sessions' decision awarded a larger 
sum of disability compensation than was warranted under the parties' stipulated facts. Ms. 
Clausing's attorney advised that, notwithstanding Judge Sessions' award, Ms. Clausing would 
accept the lesser amount of disability compensation consistent with the stipulated facts. In a letter 
dated December 6,2005, Frito-Lay's attorney rejected Ms. Clausing's offer, based on the attorney's 
own evaluation of Ms. Clausing's claim and without reference to the terms of Judge Session's 
decision. 
After rejecting Ms. Clausing's demand for payment, Frito-Lay took no action to challenge 
Judge Sessions' decision, nor did Frito-Lay pay the compensation awarded to Ms. Clausing by that 
decision. On December 20, 2005, Ms. Clausing asked Judge Sessions to issue an abstract of 
judgment so she could force Frito-Lay to pay the compensation. On December 21,2005, Frito-Lay 
filed a "Rule 60(b) Motion For Relief From Judgment" asking Judge Sessions to set aside his award 
of temporary total disability compensation and to conduct an evidentiary hearing on that issue.1 
On March 17, 2006, Judge Sessions denied Frito-Lay's Rule 60(b) motion on the grounds 
Frito-Lay had not satisfied the standards set forth in Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. for granting such a request. 
Frito-Lay now asks the Appeals Board to review Judge Sessions' denial of its Rule 60(b) motion. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Frito-Lay argues that Judge Sessions erred in denying its Rule 60(b) motion. A more 
fundamental question is whether Frito-Lay was entitled to raise such a motion in connection with the 
Commission's administrative adjudication of Ms. Clausing's workers' compensation claim. Because 
neither Judge Sessions' decision nor the parties' memoranda addressed this fundamental question, 
the Appeals Board asked the parties to submit supplemental memoranda on that point. Having now 
reviewed the parties' supplemental memoranda, the Appeals Board concludes that Rule 60(b) is not 
applicable to this administrative adjudicative proceeding. 
In 1987, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"; 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated), which applies "to every agency of the state and 
governs state agency action that determines the legal rights, duties . . . or other legal interests of an 
identifiable person " See UAPA, §63-46b-l(a). Thus, the Labor Commission's proceedings to 
adjudicate claims for workers' compensation benefits, including Ms. Clausing's claim for such 
l "Rule 60(b)" is a provision of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which permits a court to relieve a 
party from final judgment upon a showing of, among other things, "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect." 
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benefits, are subject to the procedures established by UAPA. 
The Appeals Board recognizes that in two areas—discovery and default—UAPA has 
specifically incorporated the standards established by the Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure. But in 
other areas, including review of decisions issued by Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs"), UAPA 
has established its own procedures. Specifically, §63-46b-12 of UAPA requires a party seeking 
relief from an ALJ's decision to file a written request for review within 30 days in accordance with 
applicable statutes or agency rules. In workers' compensation proceedings, the applicable statutes 
are the Utah Labor Commission Act (Title 34A, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated) and the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act (Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
Section 34A-l-303(4)(a) of the Utah Labor Commission Act provides that decisions issued 
by Commission ALJs are subject to full review by either the Commissioner or the Appeals Board. 
Section § 34A-1-303 also provides that an ALJ's decision is final "unless a further appeal is 
initiated: (a) under this title; and (b) in accordance with the rules of the commission governing the 
review." Section 34A-2-801(3) of the Workers' Compensation Act mandates that such appeals must 
be filed within 30 days after the decision is issued. 
In simple terms, the foregoing provisions of UAPA, the Labor Commission Act and the 
Workers' Compensation Act establish a comprehensive and integrated system that allows the parties 
to obtain full review and, where appropriate, complete relief from any factual or legal error that may 
be contained in an ALJ's decision. However, in seeking such relief, the parties must follow the 
procedures created by those statutes, and nothing in UAPA, the Labor Commission Act, or the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act authorizes use of the procedures found in Rule 60(b) U.R.C. 
The Appeals Board is aware that Judge Sessions' decision may have awarded excessive 
temporary total disability compensation to Ms. Clausing. However, Frito-Lay had a remedy readily 
available: it could have requested Commission or Appeals Board review of Judge Sessions' 
decision. This review procedure is well-known to attorneys practicing before the Labor Commission. 
It is simple and inexpensive. It does, however, require that parties carefully read and evaluate the 
ALJs' decisions within the 30-day period permitted for filing requests for review. In this case, 
because Frito-Lay never requested review of Judge Sessions' decision, it waived its opportunity to 
request correction. 
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that adjudication of Ms. Clausing's workers' 
compensation claim is governed by the provisions of UAPA, the Labor Commission Act, and the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. These statutes do not authorize Frito-Lay's attempt to use Rule 
60(b), U.R.C.P., as a method of obtain relief from Judge Sessions' decision of September 23,2005. 
Because Frito-Lay's purported Rule 60(b) motion was not cognizable in this workers' compensation 
proceeding, Judge Sessions' decision addressing the merits of the Rule 60(b) motion is a nullity. 
Furthermore, Judge Sessions' decision of September 23, 2005, is final and remains in effect. 
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ORDER 
The Appeals Board dismisses Frito-Lay's Rule 60(b) motion and strikes Judge Sessions' 
decision of March 17, 2006, purporting to address the, merits of that motion. Judge Sessions' 
decision of September 23,2005, remains in effect. It is so ordered. 
Dated this of October, 2006. 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
L&* 
Patricia S, Drawe 
JoJephE. Hatch 
NOTICE OF APPEAR RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for recons idcration must be je^ fiiyfid by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motion For Review in the matter of Amy 
Clausing, Case No. 03-0892, was mailed first class postage prepaid this J?T~day of-Septcmbcrr 
2006, to the following: Oofeik*v 
Amy Clausing 
1322 Sonata St 
Salt Lake City UT 84116 
Frito Lay 
6301 W 4700 S 
KearnsUT 84118 
K. Dawn Atkin, Esq. 
1111 E Brickyard RdSte 206 
Salt Lake City UT 84106 
Theodore Kanell, Esq. 
136 ES Temple Ste 1700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
/MAds 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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ORDER 
The Appeals Board dismisses Frito-Lay's Rule 60(b) motion and strikes Judge Sessions' 
decision of March 17, 2006, purporting to address the merits of that motion. Judge Sessions' 
decision of September 23, 2005, remains in effect. It is so ordered. 
Dated this day of October, 2006. 
Patricia S. Drawe * 
Joseph E. Hatch 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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